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Abstract 
 
As Internet telephony systems continue to replace 
existing Public Switched Telephone Network systems, 
proxy servers running the Session Initiation Protocol 
(SIP) will continue to grow in importance for Voice-
over-IP deployments that use SIP for call signaling.  
Since the protection of the global telecommunications 
infrastructure is critical to people's everyday lives, 
ensuring the availability of SIP proxy servers under 
attack should be a high priority.  This paper first 
describes a disruptive denial-of-service attack that 
exploits the semantics of the SIP protocol to exhaust 
resources at a stateful SIP proxy server.  Unlike 
previous approaches that focus on flooding-based 
denial-of-service attacks, we consider attacks that do 
not result in high incoming call traffic rates at the SIP 
proxy server.  After describing this semantic-based 
attack, we then propose a new algorithm to reduce the 
effects of such an attack.  Our algorithm has been 
implemented in a SIP proxy server and evaluated 
extensively through experiments on a local testbed.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Voice-over-IP (VoIP) technology is continuing to 
emerge as a feasible option to replace traditional 
telephone systems that use the Public Switched 
Telephone Network (PSTN).  In comparison to PSTN-
based systems, VoIP allows packet-switched data 
networks to be utilized for telephony and is more 
easily integrated with Internet-based services, such as 
e-mail or Web browsing. 
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an 
application-layer signaling protocol for session 
creation and management [1].  These sessions are 
typically associated with applications requiring real-
time communication, such as Internet telephony or 
instant messaging.  In addition to its use by many 
Internet telephony service providers, SIP is also 
incorporated into the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) 
architecture defined by 3GPP [2].  The IMS 
architecture facilitates the delivery of Internet-based 
multimedia communication services to mobile users by 
telecommunications service providers (e.g., cellular 
phone service companies). 
As SIP continues to play a larger role in our global 
telecommunications infrastructure, it will be critically 
important to secure SIP-based infrastructures from 
disruptive attacks.  For example, a group of attackers 
might be hired by a competitor of company X to 
disable company X's VoIP-based telephone system 
through an attack on their SIP proxy servers.  A 
similar attack on Web servers owned by different 
companies from a malicious competitor has previously 
been reported [3].  Attacks on governmental Web 
servers have also been reported [4]. 
As VoIP systems continue to be deployed within 
enterprises, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
attackers will target SIP proxy servers in the same way 
that Web servers are currently targeted.  Therefore, the 
protection of SIP-based infrastructures will be required 
to ensure the availability of critical telecommunication 
services for the enterprise. 
This paper makes the following contributions: 
 
1. We describe and measure the effects of a 
denial-of-service (DoS) attack on SIP 
proxy servers.  This attack exploits the 
semantics of the SIP protocol without 
requiring a high traffic rate from the 
attackers.  Unlike previous work [5,6], we 
do not focus on flooding-based DoS 
attacks. 
2. We designed and implemented an 
algorithm that releases resources 
associated with potentially malicious 
transactions at the SIP proxy server when 
it experiences heavy load.  Our algorithm 
makes more resources available for 
legitimate transactions. 
In the next section, we will introduce some 
background information about the basic SIP call 
scenario that we consider throughout the paper.  
Section 3 describes our attack model.  Section 4 
presents our algorithm to provide some protection of 
the SIP proxy server from attacks.  Experimental 
results appear in Section 5 and related work appears in 
Section 6.  Finally, we conclude and briefly discuss 
future work in the last section.  
 
2. Call Scenario 
 
As mentioned in our introduction, SIP is a 
signaling protocol for session management.  Since 
many different scenarios for call establishment are 
possible, we have decided to focus on one basic call 
scenario throughout this paper for the sake of clarity.  
Although our techniques are also applicable to more 
complicated scenarios with more entities and different 
message sequences, this basic scenario is sufficient to 
clearly illustrate the attack that we consider and the 
corresponding protection mechanism that we propose. 
Our basic call scenario includes the following three 
logical SIP entities: user agent client (UAC), user 
agent server (UAS), and stateful SIP proxy server.  
These SIP entities and others are defined in [1].  
Figure 1 depicts our basic call scenario. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Basic SIP Call Scenario 
 
In Figure 1, the UAC (i.e., caller) requests the 
initiation of a communication session with the UAS 
(i.e., callee) by sending an INVITE request via the 
proxy1.  Upon receiving the INVITE at the proxy, the 
proxy will first send a 100 Trying provisional 
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 Proxy and proxy server will be used interchangeably in this paper. 
response to the UAC to prevent unnecessary 
retransmissions of the INVITE request.  Next, the 
proxy will forward the INVITE to the UAS.  Upon 
receiving the INVITE at the UAS, the UAS will 
immediately send a 180 Ringing provisional 
response to the UAC via the proxy.  Similar to a 
telephone, the UAS is now in the ringing state.  Once 
the UAS picks up the call, it sends a 200 OK final 
response to the UAC via the proxy.  The UAC will 
acknowledge reception of the 200 OK final response 
with an ACK request.  An interactive communication 
session has now been established between the UAC 
and UAS, which allows them to communicate directly. 
Although it is not shown in Figure 1, an 
established session can be terminated when either the 
UAC or UAS sends a BYE request to the other party.  
The other party will then acknowledge reception of the 
BYE request by responding with a 200 OK final 
response. 
In Figure 1, the proxy can be thought of as a server 
that handles all incoming calls for the UAS.  For 
example, a company using VoIP might issue logical 
SIP URIs to its employees (e.g., 
sip:alice@company.com).  However, since employees 
might be at different locations2 throughout the day, it 
will be necessary to map the logical SIP URIs to actual 
contact IP addresses (e.g., sip:alice@128.174.254.29) 
when an incoming call is received.  In conjunction 
with a registrar and location service, the company can 
use SIP proxies to route incoming INVITE requests to 
the UAS at its current location.  More details on using 
registrars and location services with SIP can be found 
in [1]. 
Before describing our attack model, it is important 
to distinguish between stateless and stateful proxies, 
which are both defined in RFC 3261 [1].  A stateless 
proxy simply forwards messages based only on the 
message header parameters without maintaining any 
transaction context.  A stateful proxy will maintain 
transaction state to associate responses with previously 
handled requests.  In Figure 1, the stateful proxy will 
create a transaction context when it receives the 
INVITE request.  The proxy will release the resources 
associated with that transaction when it forwards the 
200 OK final response from the UAS to the UAC. 
One reason for using a stateful proxy rather than a 
stateless proxy is to enable the deployment of richer 
functionality within the proxy.  For example, a user 
agent U might register multiple contact IP addresses 
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 Example locations could possibly include a desktop computer at the 
office or a laptop computer at home. 
for its single logical SIP URI.  When a stateful proxy 
receives an INVITE request for U, it can fork that 
request by forwarding the INVITE request to all of 
the registered contact addresses for U in parallel.  
When U picks up the call at one contact address, the 
stateful proxy can then send a CANCEL request to the 
other contact addresses where U did not pick up the 
call.  Stateless proxies cannot support this forking 
behavior since they do not maintain any transaction 
context.  Furthermore, RFC 3261 specifically states 
that requests forwarded to more than one location 
must be handled statefully [1]. 
 
3. Attack Model 
 
Our attack model considers DoS attacks on stateful 
proxies originating from attackers that do not rely on 
traffic flooding or deviations from the SIP protocol 
defined in [1].  In our attack model, malicious or 
compromised user agents exploit the semantics of the 
SIP protocol by intentionally increasing the amount of 
transaction state that must be maintained by a stateful 
proxy. 
As mentioned in Section 2, a stateful proxy must 
maintain transaction context from the time it receives 
an INVITE request from the UAC (i.e., incoming call 
from caller) until it forwards the 200 OK final 
response from the UAS to the UAC (i.e., call pickup at 
the callee).  A stateful proxy with limited resources 
can only maintain a finite amount of transaction state 
before service disruptions start to occur. 
Notice that the length of time for which the proxy 
must maintain transaction state for an INVITE 
request can be artificially increased by the UAS 
purposely staying in the ringing state for an unusually 
long amount of time before picking up the incoming 
call.  Such UASs will be referred to as excessively 
ringing UASs.  If one or more UACs repeatedly send 
INVITE requests (even at a relatively low traffic rate) 
to one or more excessively ringing UASs located 
behind a particular SIP proxy, then that stateful proxy 
can potentially become the target of what we call a 
Ringing-based DoS attack, which we named after 
the 180 Ringing provisional response that 
indicates the UAS is in the ringing state. 
In a Ringing-based DoS attack, excessively 
ringing UASs consume resources at the stateful proxy 
for a longer period of time, which makes these 
resources unavailable for other incoming calls.  As we 
will show in our experimental results in Section 5, 
even a relatively low rate of incoming calls to 
excessively ringing UASs can significantly disrupt 
overall service. 
Many possibilities exist for a user agent to become 
a willing or unwilling participant in a Ringing-
based DoS attack.  First, attacking UACs might 
collude with disgruntled insiders within an enterprise 
that willingly act as excessively ringing UASs.  
Second, attacking UACs might automatically scan a 
list of SIP URIs to detect unresponsive callees.  These 
unresponsive callees might unwillingly become 
excessively ringing UASs during an attack since they 
will not pick up the incoming calls from the attacking 
UACs.  Lastly, attacking UACs might utilize a botnet 
located behind a target SIP proxy to act as excessively 
ringing UASs.  In the Web application domain, such 
botnets have previously been rented to disrupt online 
businesses [7].  Evidence of using VoIP networks to 
build botnets has already been reported [14]. 
 
4. Random Early Termination (RET) 
 
Since Ringing-based DoS attacks depend on the 
delay between receiving an INVITE request at the 
proxy and forwarding the corresponding 200 OK 
response, simply terminating all local transactions at 
the proxy associated with currently ringing calls that 
exceed a certain ringing time threshold might seem 
like a straightforward solution at first glance.  
However, using this simple approach by itself is not 
enough to meet our requirements described in the 
following subsection. 
 
4.1. Requirements 
 
The first requirement is that any solution should 
consider that even well-behaved UASs (i.e., callees) 
have different response times to incoming calls.  For 
example, answering a cell phone from one's pocket 
might take less time than answering a telephone in a 
different room.  Consequently, determining an 
appropriate ringing time threshold to apply to all 
incoming calls is not as obvious as it seems and should 
not be the only parameter considered. 
Secondly, given the difficulty of determining 
absolute ringing time thresholds, it would not be 
desirable to terminate transactions unnecessarily when 
the proxy can easily handle the current amount of 
transaction state.  Therefore, under light loads, the 
proxy should allow potentially legitimate incoming 
calls with long ringing times to have an opportunity to 
be picked up whenever possible. 
Lastly, rather than using some rigid threshold, 
incoming calls should be dropped according to the 
duration of their ringing times.  Specifically, an 
incoming call that has been ringing for a slightly long 
time should be less likely to be dropped at the proxy 
than a call that has been ringing for a very long time. 
 
4.2. Algorithm 
 
Given our requirements, we developed the Random 
Early Termination (RET) algorithm for dropping 
transactions suspected of involving excessively ringing 
UASs when the proxy is under heavy load.  The goal 
of our algorithm is to give stateful proxies some 
protection from Ringing-based DoS attacks.  As the 
name implies, RET is partly inspired by the Random 
Early Detection (RED) algorithm used by routers for 
congestion avoidance [8].  However, there are several 
substantial differences between the two algorithms 
that will become more evident in this section.  For 
example, one major difference is that probabilistic 
dropping in RET considers transaction state used at 
the proxy by a particular incoming call.  In contrast, 
RED considers bandwidth used at the router. 
The basic idea behind RET is that stateful proxies 
should drop incoming calls most likely to involve 
excessively ringing UASs when the total amount of 
transaction state at the proxy becomes too large.  
Dropping calls involves terminating the associated 
local transactions at the proxy and sending the 
appropriate cancellation and/or error messages to the 
user agents involved.  By dropping these incoming 
calls, more resources will be available for newer 
incoming calls that might otherwise be dropped 
without protection from RET. 
One critical aspect in the design of RET is selecting 
which calls should be dropped.  Upon receiving a new 
INVITE request, the proxy will initialize the 
corresponding transaction context.  A current 
timestamp will then be added to this transaction 
context to later determine the transaction's age.  To 
implement RET, the stateful SIP proxy maintains a 
sorted list of all currently active transaction contexts 
ordered from the oldest to the newest as shown in 
Figure 2.  Transactions involving excessively ringing 
UASs are dropped from the sorted list periodically by 
running RET with a specified frequency. 
In order to prevent a newly generated call from 
being dropped too soon, we added the condition that a 
transaction can only be eligible for termination if it's 
age exceeds a certain minimum ringing time threshold 
MRTT, which is a constant value that can be set as a 
parameter.  MRTT is also used for probabilistic 
dropping as described in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Sorted List of Active Transaction 
Contexts 
 
Two threshold parameters T1 and T2 are associated 
with the number of active transaction contexts 
currently in the sorted list.  All transactions from the 
newest transaction context up to transaction context 
T1 (indicated by the white region in Figure 2) will not 
be considered for termination.  Therefore, under a 
light load with no more than T1 currently active 
transactions, the proxy will not drop any incoming 
calls regardless of how long they have been ringing.  
This prevents unnecessary call drops.  If the number of 
concurrent transactions is greater than T1, then all 
transactions between T1 up to T2 (indicated by the 
gray region in Figure 2), which are older than MRTT, 
will be dropped with a certain probability Prob shown 
in Equation 1.  The value age in Equation 1 is 
determined by taking the difference between the 
current time and the transaction context's timestamp. 
 
Prob = 1 – e MRTT
MRTTage−
−
 (1) 
 
In the RET algorithm (shown later in pseudo-code), 
remember that only transactions older than MRTT are 
eligible for dropping.  Equation 1 was chosen in order 
to create a substantially higher probability of dropping 
calls with ringing times significantly larger than 
MRTT compared to the probability of dropping calls 
with ringing times slightly over the MRTT. 
Finally, if the number of concurrent transactions is 
greater than T2, then all transaction contexts between 
T2 up to the oldest transaction (indicated by the black 
region in Figure 2), which are older than MRTT, will 
definitely be dropped. 
Notice that transaction contexts are only removed 
from the sorted list of active transactions when one of 
the following events occurs: (1) stateful proxy receives 
a 200 OK final response from the UAS indicating 
that the call was picked up, or (2) incoming call is 
dropped according to RET.  Incoming calls with 
shorter ringing times are thus less likely to be dropped 
by RET. 
Pseudo-code for the RET algorithm follows. 
 
RET Algorithm. 
 
MRTT = minimum ringing time threshold parameter 
numactive = current number of transaction contexts in sorted list L 
 
// Number of mandatory drops X 
X = MAX( 0, numactive – T2 ) 
// Number of probabilistic drops Y 
Y = MAX( 0, numactive – X – T1 ) 
 
// Currently active transaction contexts in L ordered 
// from oldest to youngest (based on timestamp) starting 
// from index 0 with the 0th transaction being the oldest 
 
currenttime = current local time at SIP proxy 
 
// Drop all transactions above T2 older than MRTT 
for i = 0 to X–1 
   trans = L[i] 
   if ( currenttime – trans.timestamp ) > MRTT 
      DROP trans 
 
// Probabilistically drop transactions between T1 and T2 
// older than MRTT 
for i = X to X+Y–1 
   trans = L[i] 
   if ( currenttime – trans.timestamp ) > MRTT 
      age = currenttime – trans.timestamp 
      ratio = ( age – MRTT ) / MRTT 
      DROP trans with probability 1 – exp(–ratio) 
 
 
As shown by the pseudo-code, if the sorted list of 
transaction contexts has N transaction contexts 
corresponding to the state for N currently active 
transactions, then the RET algorithm will process at 
most N–T1 transaction contexts as potential candidates 
for call drops.  Therefore, the RET algorithm is O(N).  
However, in order to reduce overhead, the frequency 
of the RET algorithm can be adjusted.  For example, 
our experiments in Section 5 ran the RET algorithm at 
the SIP proxy once every two seconds. 
One consequence of using the safeguard parameter 
MRTT to prevent the dropping of recently initiated 
transactions is that an attacker could potentially flood 
the stateful proxy with many new INVITE requests 
whose resulting transactions would not be dropped due 
to their young age.  However, such flooding-based 
DoS attacks have been previously addressed and are 
outside the scope of our work [5,6].  The RET 
algorithm is designed to prevent Ringing-based DoS 
attacks that exploit the semantics of the SIP protocol.  
Flooding-based prevention mechanisms can be 
combined with RET to collectively prevent both types 
of DoS attacks. 
Another concern is that stealthy UASs might 
reduce their ringing times during an attack for a given 
traffic rate to avoid being dropped according to RET.  
However, by reducing their ringing times to avoid 
detection, the attackers would also reduce the amount 
of transaction state in the SIP proxy, which is our 
desired goal. 
One final concern is that legitimate calls that 
happen to be ringing for a long period of time might 
be mistakenly dropped by RET.  However, remember 
that the RET algorithm only drops calls when the SIP 
proxy is under heavy load.  When a SIP proxy 
experiences a strain on its local resources, one side 
effect of RET is that calls consuming more resources 
(i.e., calls ringing for a longer time) would be more 
likely to be dropped.  An argument could be made that 
this behavior of RET is desirable with respect to 
fairness.  We experienced relatively few mistaken call 
drops during our experiments described in Section 5. 
 
5. Performance Evaluation 
 
In order to evaluate RET, we added code for the 
RET algorithm to an actual SIP proxy by modifying 
our JAIN SIP-based implementation of a stateful SIP 
proxy server [9].  User agent traffic for our 
experiments was generated by the open source SIPp 
testing tool [10].  Our local testbed had three 
machines connected over a local area network with 
each machine running one of the following: (1) 
emulated SIPp UACs, (2) emulated SIPp UASs, and 
(3) stateful JAIN SIP proxy. 
We were able to control the incoming call rate from 
the UACs and ringing times at the UASs by adjusting 
the appropriate parameters in SIPp.  For each 
experiment, we used SIPp to emulate benign UACs 
calling benign UASs and malicious UACs calling 
malicious UASs.  Since both benign and malicious 
calls went through the same proxy in the experiments, 
malicious calls were able to cause disruptions in 
benign calls through Ringing-based DoS attacks on 
the proxy.  Benign calls had ringing times uniformly 
distributed between 0.5 and 5 seconds while malicious 
calls had ringing times uniformly distributed between 
30 and 120 seconds.  According to RFC 3261, a UAS 
has up to three minutes between responses (e.g., 
between sending a 180 Ringing provisional 
response and a 200 OK final response), which means 
that the malicious calls in our experiments do not 
violate the SIP specification, which is consistent with 
our attack model that assumes no deviation by 
malicious user agents from the SIP protocol [1]. 
In all of our experiments, the aggregate incoming 
traffic rate at the SIP proxy was 80 calls per second 
(cps) for a duration of three minutes.  After the three 
minutes of new incoming calls, we continued to 
observe the system until all calls had ended either 
successfully or unsuccessfully.  The only variable in 
the experiments was the fraction of the fixed aggregate 
incoming call traffic rate originating from malicious 
UACs.  The incoming call rate MR from the malicious 
UACs varied between 0 and 40 cps.  The incoming 
call rate BR from the benign UACs was always BR = 
80–MR in each experiment to maintain a fixed 
aggregate call rate of 80 cps. 
We deliberately chose a low incoming call traffic 
rate to clearly demonstrate that the call failures 
experienced at the benign UACs were caused by the 
Ringing-based DoS attack on the proxy.  If a high 
traffic rate had been used, then it would not be clear 
whether the calls failed due to bandwidth exhaustion 
at the proxy, which has previously been considered in 
flooding-based DoS attacks, or an excess amount of 
transaction state maintained at the proxy, which is the 
focus of our work. 
As described in Section 4, the RET algorithm 
utilizes three parameters.  For our experiments, the 
maximum ringing time threshold MRTT was set to ten 
seconds.  Thus, an incoming call is only eligible to be 
dropped after ten seconds.  The first transaction 
context threshold parameter T1 was set to 250 
concurrent transactions.  The second transaction 
context threshold parameter T2 was set to 300 
concurrent transactions.  The parameters T1 and T2 
were chosen based on the observed transaction state 
needed at our SIP proxy to handle the specified 
incoming call rate of 80 cps when all calls are benign.  
A real deployment of a stateful SIP proxy using RET 
could similarly use performance testing to determine 
appropriate T1 and T2 values.  The RET algorithm 
was run once every two seconds at the proxy during 
our experiments.  Our measurements indicate that the 
average RET execution time did not exceed 20 
milliseconds in any of our experiments. 
We varied the incoming call rate MR from the 
malicious UACs to observe the effects when different 
fractions of the fixed aggregate incoming call rate 
belong to malicious calls.  The effect of different 
malicious call rates on a stateful proxy that does not 
use RET is shown in Table 1.  Table 2 shows the effect 
of different malicious call rates on a stateful proxy that 
runs the RET algorithm once every two seconds. 
In Tables 1 and 2, the column BR corresponds to 
the incoming call rate from benign UACs and the 
column MR corresponds to the incoming call rate from 
malicious UACs.  The column MF corresponds to MR 
divided by BR+MR (i.e., the fraction of malicious calls 
in the aggregate incoming call rate of 80 cps).  The 
columns AVG and PEAK correspond to the average 
and peak number of concurrent transactions (NCT) in 
the stateful proxy, respectively.  The number of 
concurrent transactions corresponds to the number of 
simultaneously active transactions requiring some 
transaction state in the proxy. 
 
Table 1.  Number of Concurrent Transactions 
(NCT) in an Unprotected Stateful SIP Proxy 
BR 
(cps) 
MR 
(cps) 
MF 
(MR/80) 
AVG 
(NCT) 
PEAK 
(NCT) 
80 0 0.00 146.9 323 
76 4 0.05 319.1 609 
72 8 0.10 480.4 864 
64 16 0.20 757.2 1288 
40 40 0.50 1441.5 2512 
 
Table 2.  Number of Concurrent Transactions 
(NCT) in a RET-Protected Stateful SIP Proxy 
BR 
(cps) 
MR 
(cps) 
MF 
(MR/80) 
AVG 
(NCT) 
PEAK 
(NCT) 
80 0 0.00 146.0 327 
76 4 0.05 184.3 380 
72 8 0.10 205.0 396 
64 16 0.20 248.0 431 
40 40 0.50 382.6 613 
 
As expected, there is no substantial difference 
between an unprotected proxy and a RET-protected 
proxy when the percentage of malicious calls is 0%.  
However, the benefits of RET become apparent even 
when the percentage of malicious calls is as low as 5% 
(i.e., malicious UACs are only calling at a rate of 4 
cps).  In that case, RET reduces the average number of 
concurrent transactions at the proxy by 42% and 
reduces the peak number of concurrent transactions at 
the proxy by 38%.  As the fraction of malicious calls 
MF increases, so does the benefit of using RET.  For 
example, when half the calls are malicious, RET 
reduces the average number of concurrent transactions 
at the proxy by 73% and also reduces the peak number 
of concurrent transactions at the proxy by 76%.  Based 
on our experiments, RET releases a significant 
amount of resources to reduce the amount of 
transaction state created by Ringing-based DoS 
attacks. 
Figure 3 shows how the amount of transaction state 
varies over time at both unprotected and RET-
protected proxies experiencing a malicious incoming 
call rate MR = 4 cps.  Similarly, Figure 4 shows the 
transaction state over time when MR = 40 cps.  In both 
figures, the gray line indicates the number of 
concurrent transactions at an unprotected proxy while 
the black line indicates the number of concurrent 
transactions at a RET-protected proxy. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Transaction State over Time (MR=4) 
 
 
Figure 4.  Transaction State over Time (MR=40) 
 
In addition to measuring the amount of transaction 
state within the proxy, it is also important to measure 
the effect of Ringing-based DoS attacks and RET on 
disruptions experienced by benign user agents.  Tables 
3 and 4 show the number of call failures Fails 
experienced by benign UACs due to resource 
exhaustion at the proxy caused by the ongoing 
Ringing-based DoS attack.  Tables 3 and 4 also 
show the number of mistakenly dropped benign calls 
Drops caused by RET.  Fails and Drops are 
indistinguishable from the UAC's perspective.  The 
column Total indicates the total number of outgoing 
calls from benign UACs during the experiments.  
Although the ringing times at benign UASs are set to 
be no more than five seconds, it is possible for a 
benign transaction to be occasionally delayed beyond 
ten seconds due to contention at the machines 
emulating the benign UASs and the proxy. 
 
Table 3.  Overall Experience at Benign UACs with 
an Unprotected Stateful SIP Proxy 
BR 
(cps) 
MR 
(cps) 
MF 
(MR/80) 
Fails 
(# of 
calls) 
Drops 
(# of 
calls) 
Total 
(# of 
calls) 
80 0 0.00 0 0 14398 
76 4 0.05 113 0 13679 
72 8 0.10 750 0 12958 
64 16 0.20 1877 0 11518 
40 40 0.50 2825 0 7199 
 
Table 4.  Overall Experience at Benign UACs with 
a RET-Protected Stateful SIP Proxy 
BR 
(cps) 
MR 
(cps) 
MF 
(MR/80) 
Fails 
(# of 
calls) 
Drops 
(# of 
calls) 
Total 
(# of 
calls) 
80 0 0.00 0 0 14398 
76 4 0.05 0 4 13679 
72 8 0.10 0 11 12958 
64 16 0.20 0 35 11518 
40 40 0.50 0 40 7199 
 
Table 3 indicates that even a relatively low 
incoming malicious call rate MR of 4 cps can cause 
113 call failures (i.e., Fails) due to transaction state 
overload at the proxy.  Increasing the malicious call 
rate MR substantially increases the number of call 
failures.  For example, a malicious call rate of 16 cps, 
which is one-fifth of the aggregate incoming call rate 
at the unprotected proxy, causes 1877 call failures 
(i.e., 16.3% call failure rate) for benign UACs.  This 
result indicates that Ringing-based DoS attacks can 
be quite disruptive to well-behaved UACs even with 
relatively low malicious call rates. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that RET can 
eliminate all of the call failures due to transaction 
state exhaustion at the proxy, but the possibility of 
mistakenly dropping benign calls (i.e., Drops) is 
introduced.  For example, when the malicious call rate 
is 8 cps, there are 11 call drops at the RET-protected 
proxy in Table 4.  However, it is important to note that 
the number of calls mistakenly dropped for a given 
malicious call rate in Table 4 (i.e., Drops column) is 
much less than the corresponding number of call 
failures for a given malicious call rate in Table 3 (i.e., 
Fails column).  For example, when the malicious call 
rate is 40 cps in Tables 3 and 4, the RET-protected 
proxy has 98% fewer call drops compared to call 
failures at the unprotected proxy. 
  
6. Related Work 
 
To the best of our knowledge, previous work on 
protecting SIP proxies from DoS attacks has only 
considered flooding-based attacks [5,6].  One type of 
previously considered flooding-based attack involves 
sending INVITE requests at a rate high enough to 
overwhelm the targeted SIP proxy attempting to 
process all of the requests.  Unlike a flooding-based 
attack, the Ringing-based DoS attack that we 
consider only involves exploiting the semantics of the 
SIP protocol to exhaust resources at the stateful proxy.  
The Ringing-based DoS attack does not require 
malicious UACs to induce a high incoming call rate at 
the proxy through flooding and would not be detected 
using previous solutions designed for flooding-based 
attacks.  Therefore, RET is a complementary approach 
that could be used in coordination with existing 
mechanisms that focus on flooding-based attacks. 
Some previous work has also considered protecting 
emergency call services (e.g., dialing '911' in the 
United States) in the PSTN from DoS attacks 
originating from VoIP networks [11].  Fuchs et al. 
apply intrusion detection techniques at the emergency 
call center to address this problem.  In contrast, RET 
focuses on protecting proxies within the VoIP 
infrastructure, rather than PSTN. 
Other work related to SIP security has considered 
many topics ranging from billing attacks that lead to 
overcharging of VoIP subscribers [12] to intrusion 
detection for VoIP systems [13].  Although interesting, 
these topics are beyond the scope of our work. 
 
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
Our experimental results indicate that Ringing-
based DoS attacks can be quite disruptive by 
exhausting the limited resources of a stateful SIP 
proxy.  Unlike flooding-based DoS attacks, these 
Ringing-based DoS attacks do not require attackers 
to induce a high incoming traffic rate at the proxy.  To 
mitigate the negative effects of such an attack, we 
designed and implemented the RET algorithm that 
selectively drops calls that have been ringing for a 
long time to release the associated transaction 
resources at the proxy.  Our performance evaluation 
demonstrates that RET is very effective at protecting 
stateful proxies from Ringing-based DoS attacks. 
Currently, we only consider attacks on a single 
proxy.  In the future, we plan to expand on this work 
by considering the protection of entire distributed 
infrastructures consisting of several SIP proxy servers. 
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